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X-WR-CALDESC:Events for Computer Science and Engineering
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TZID:Asia/Kolkata
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DTSTART:20260101T000000
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20261008T120000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20261008T130000
DTSTAMP:20261010T162944
CREATED:20261001T054452Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20261001T054452Z
UID:2667-1791460800-1791464400@homecse.iitd.ac.in
SUMMARY:Who Gets What? Fair Division of Indivisible Goods by Prof. Kurt Mehlhorn
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: \nA set of indivisible goods\, e.g.\, a car\, a house\, a toothbrush\, . . .  has to be split among a set of agents in a fair manner. Each agent has its own valuation function for sets of goods. What constitutes a fair allocation? When does a fair allocation exist? If it exists\, can we compute it efficiently? Can we approximate fair allocations? \nThere are three main notions of fairness: envy-based\, share-based\, and welfare-based. In the first part of the talk\, I will discuss all three notions. \nIn the second part\, I will concentrate on envy-freeness: Nobody should get more than I do. For indivisible goods\, envy-freeness cannot be achieved in general. Think of two persons and one good which both persons like. The good has to be given to one of the persons\, and the other person will envy. Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) is a relaxation. One person may envy another person\, but upon removal of any good from the other person’s bundle\, the envy goes away. \nImagine the following hypothetical dialogue. Two brothers inherit the property of their parents. One says to the other. You are getting a house\, a car\, and a toothbrush. I envy you\, because I prefer what you get over what I get. But this is OK\, because\, if I discard the toothbrush\, I do not envy you anymore. I will mainly discuss two results: \n\nFor three agents and additive valuations\, an EFX-allocation always exists. A valuation is additive\, if the value of a bundle of items is the sum of the values of the items in the bundle (JACM ’24\, Operations Research ’24).\nFor general valuations\, EFX-allocations do not always exist. (arXiv ’26).\n\n 
URL:https://homecse.iitd.ac.in/event/who-gets-what-fair-division-of-indivisible-goods-by-prof-kurt-mehlhorn/
LOCATION:Bharti 501\, IIT Campus\, Hauz Khas\, New Delhi
CATEGORIES:Seminars
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DTSTART;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20261012T120000
DTEND;TZID=Asia/Kolkata:20261012T130000
DTSTAMP:20261010T162944
CREATED:20260930T052402Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260930T052402Z
UID:2663-1791806400-1791810000@homecse.iitd.ac.in
SUMMARY:Contagion and Control-Policy Games by Prof. Sanjiv Kapoor
DESCRIPTION:Abstract: We consider non-atomic games in populations provided with a choice of preventive policies to act against a contagion spreading amongst interacting populations\, be it biological organisms or connected computing devices. The spreading model of the contagion is the standard SIR model. Each participant in the population has a choice from amongst a set of precautionary policies\, with each policy presenting a payoff or utility\, assumed to be the same for individuals adopting that policy; the risk being the possibility of infection. The policy groups interact with each other. I also define a network model to model interactions between different population sets. The population sets reside at nodes of the network and follow a choice of policies specific to that node. We define game-theoretic models and study the computation of equilibrium and inefficiency (Price of Anarchy) of allowing for individual decision-making\, as opposed to centralized control. The POA is a function of the reproduction number of the contagion\,\n\nI will also include briefly some other results:\nhttps://royalsocietypublishing.org/rsos/article/12/10/242277/235987/Models-for-SARS-CoV-2-health-policies-social
URL:https://homecse.iitd.ac.in/event/contagion-and-control-policy-games-by-prof-sanjiv-kapoor/
LOCATION:Bharti 501\, IIT Campus\, Hauz Khas\, New Delhi
CATEGORIES:Seminars
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