Contagion and Control-Policy Games by Prof. Sanjiv Kapoor
October 12 @ 12:00 pm - 1:00 pm
Abstract: We consider non-atomic games in populations provided with a choice of preventive policies to act against a contagion spreading amongst interacting populations, be it biological organisms or connected computing devices. The spreading model of the contagion is the standard SIR model. Each participant in the population has a choice from amongst a set of precautionary policies, with each policy presenting a payoff or utility, assumed to be the same for individuals adopting that policy; the risk being the possibility of infection. The policy groups interact with each other. I also define a network model to model interactions between different population sets. The population sets reside at nodes of the network and follow a choice of policies specific to that node. We define game-theoretic models and study the computation of equilibrium and inefficiency (Price of Anarchy) of allowing for individual decision-making, as opposed to centralized control. The POA is a function of the reproduction number of the contagion,
I will also include briefly some other results:
https://royalsocietypublishing.org/rsos/article/12/10/242277/235987/Models-for-SARS-CoV-2-health-policies-social